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COALITION WARFARE:
A SUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENT IN COMBINED COMMAND, 1914-1918
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES 0. AGNEW, USA

allies, is impeded. Differences in language,
tactics, organization, and historical patterns
can obstruct the successful establishment and
maintenance of a joint effort.
Despite the loftiest of intentions, the
leaders of nation states are extremely
reluctant to compromise when national
sovereignty and prestige are at stake. The
t w o- state collaborative relationship in
wartime is the simplest case in the analysis of
coalition warfare. As additional states enter
the conflict the problem becomes extremely
complex. The resultant involved situation is
caused by the algebraically increasing number
of interactions among the states which is
compounded by the ceaseless pursuit of an
elusive consensus.
Each allied state must subordinate its
national authority to the extent necessary to
align its resources with those of its
sisters-in-conflict toward a common end. In
the military sense, such an alignment implies
creation of a combined force, consisting of
the national military contributions of two or
more wartime partners, under a single
commander who is vested with requisite
authority to direct the operations of the
various national components toward an
objective. When the partner-states agree to the
subordination of sovereignty to the extent
that such an organization can be formed, it is
t e r m e d a "combined command." The
command's methods of employing its forces
are called "combined operations."
The fundamental purpose of a combined
command is to direct the united military
e f f o r t o f allied nations towards the
accomplishment of commonly accepted
objectives in the area to which the command
has been assigned. T o accomplish this task,
many problems of combined command and
planning, purely military in nature, have to be
solved at the international level.

(How much consideration should a plan
to create a combined command give to
the means of realizing the individual
national objectives of each participating
country? Can combined operations be
maintained effectively without requiring
a collective subordination of national will
and authority among the various
coalitional states?)
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INTRODUCTION
THE NATURE OF COMBINED OPERATIONS

If Country A attacks Country B and the
latter resists with armed force, the result is
usually a war of indeterminate ferocity and
duration. Each state pursues its national aims,
whether they are territorial aggrandizement,
ideological extension, economic exploitation,
or self-preservation. If a third country, C,
enters the war on the side of either A or B,
t h e difficulties o f waging war are
compounded for the ensuing entente. NOW,
the national objectives of the partners, often
divergent, become comingled; and
cooperation, even among the most sincere of
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Like most generalizations, the one just
stated offers no clue t o the solution of the
myriad problems and conflicts which arise
among partners. The passing reference to
s o l u t i o n " at the international level"
oversimplifies the resolution of conflicts of
interest, elltangled philosophies, and the
u n c o o r d i n a t e d efforts of a host of
personalities which invariably accompany the
formation and perfolmance of a combined
c o m m a n d . C o n t e m p o r a r y military
d o c u m e n t a t i o n does not provide an
authoritative, useful handbook for combined
operations. As international adversaries,
partners, and the scenes of conflict shift
throughout the march of history there has
been a marked difference in each attempt to
assimilate separate national forces.
THE SETTING: WESTERN EUROPE 1914-1918

World War I was the cradle of combined
operations for the modern age. Never before
had such large, dissimilar armies been
integrated into a relatively homogeneous
force, responsive to a single commander. For
that reason, the Great War merits special
attention. Allies had fought together before,
and national forces had been placed under
foreign commanders, but in the main these
were small contingents in small wars,
mercenaries, or volunteer levies. Not even the
Allied coalition against Napoleon involved the
total international effort, the tremendous
territorial expanses, the high casualty figures,
and the monetary outlay brought about by
World War I.
The Great War provided an appropriate
stage for the first combined operations
experiment. It involved all the great powers of
the world in addition to a host of lesser ones.
For the first time in the history of warfare,
m a s s d e s t r u c t i o n w e a p o n s were
introduced-the gas shell and a greatly
improved version of the machine gun, which
accounted for a large proportion of casualties
on both sides. The armored vehicle and the
airplane appeared and, although playing
relatively minor roles, were grim heralds of a
later conflict, the tragic offspring of the first.
On the other hand, the struggle also involved
the martial relics of another era. The hooves

of cavalry echoed a fading glory and the
artillery caisson rumbled towards oblivion.
Thus, the war was a transition between
ancient and modern, hurling mankind into an
age of technological achievement which in 50
years would equal the endeavors of all
previous centuries.
Observers and historians have decried the
uselessness of the war for its dissipation of
human and material assets, particularly in
view of the feeble peace which followed. Yet,
paradoxically, amid the carnage and
disillusionment, the leaders of four great
p o w e r s momentarily put aside their
differences to achieve a common goal. Men
matured with the times. Nationalism was
subdued and a degree of international
harmony prevailed for seven brief months.
Tragically, this transient spirit was not present
during the fateful months of 1919 when the
destiny of future generations was decided.
Combined operations were a persistent
dilemma for the Allies. The tortuous
development of these operations mirrors the
reverses of fortune, the exigencies, and the
rise and wane of hopes of the Allied leaders
throughout the war. The lessons were
painfully learned, yet quickly forgotten.
America's General Tasker H. Bliss' comment

VS Anny

As US military representative on the Supreme War
Council in 1917, General Tasker H. Bliss,
a former Army War College president,
saw the need for Allied unity of command.

in his papers on the state of affairs in 1917
characterizes the attitudes which existed until
true coalition was achieved:

Interestingly, t h e r e was no hazy
overlapping of events. At certain times,
certain things happened and the Allied
organization and conduct of the war reflected
them. These three distinct phases mark the
progress of the Allies towards a suitable
strategic arrangement. Starting from a loose
alliance, the Allies advanced through a stage
of semi-mutual support, to a truly unified
coalition which braked the German spring
offensive in 19 18 and resulted in an autumn
victory.

When the news was good, the Allies
pulled apart, each bent on safeguarding
his own national interests. . . . Unless real
coordination came, they might be in a
position of never being able to follow up
good news with sufficient unity for a
final triumph.
What was wrong?

PHASE I: 4 AUGUST 1914 TO 6 NOVEMBER 191 7
THE EVOLUTION OF ALLIED
COMBINED OPERATIONS

"The outbreak of war in 1914set in motion
forces more gigantic than any war had seen.
Two million Germans were on the march, the
greater part against France. . . ." So wrote
Liddell H a r t , describing the massive
beginnings of the conflict, dominated by the
right wing of Kaiser Wilhelm's armies
wheeling through Belgium and northern
France. The Schlieffen plan, devised in 1905,
was t h e keystone of the offensive.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r Germany, Moltke
overextended his lines of communication and
committed several other tactical blunders in
the initial onslaught. September saw the
Battle of the Marne, which spelled the failure
of the German summer offensive, followed by
the Gesman retreat to the Aisne, the attempt
to turn the Allies' flank and the race to the
sea, the First Battle of Ypres, and inevitably,
winter. With winter came the slow, merciless
descent into the stalemate of trench warfare
which characterized the Western Front from
that period through most of 19 18. The war of
mud, hand-bomb, and barbed wire had
begun-with the accompanying frightful
attrition. Both sides mounted a barbarous
bacule as one tried to overbalance the other.
Neither antagonist was successful.
The period was dramatized by the Great
Campaigns-Neuve Chapelle and Second
Ypres in 1915, Verdun and the Somme in
19 16; both expensive actions. (These two
encounters cost the British and French P
550,000 and 400,000 men, respectively.)
Nivelle's ill-fated offensive of 1917 (the
Second Battle of the Aisne) resulted in a

On 23 June 1919, the United States Senate
acknowledged a report enumerating the total
cost of the Great War to the belligerents.
Battle deaths totaled an astronomical figure
of 7,582,300. The young manhood of almost
every state in Europe had been recklessly
scythed away. The dollar costs were equally
staggering, but not as grievously so as the
human loss. The economic tab was rounded
off at between 180 and 190 billion dollars for
all parties to the conflict for direct war costs.
What type of war, one wonders, could
produce such an exorbitant expenditure of
human and material resources in only four
years? What possible justification can be given
for such a tragic waste and how could it have
been reduced? The political ramifications
which engendered the conflict will not be
examined here, but highlights of the various
events will be discussed t o show how the
wearying attrition and the nightmare of
Central Power offensives compelled the Allies
to undertake concerted action. Regrettably,
their ultimate philosophy, if only adopted a
year sooner, might have reduced the total
casualty list by 25 per cent.
F r o m t h e standpoint of combined
operations maturation, the war conveniently
breaks itself into three distinct phases:
* Phase I: 4 August 19 14 - 6 November

Phase II: 7 November 1917 - 21 March
Phase III: 22March- 11 November 1918.
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ALLIED COMMAND STRUCTURE, WORLD WAR I
PHASE I
(4 AUGUST 1914 6 NOVEMBER 1917)
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defeat and was the cause of a short-lived
mutiny among French troops. All this was
followed by Haig's Third Battle of Ypres
where 250,000 men were traded for five miles
of useless, sodden, German-held territory. It is
d e b a t a b l e which of the latter two
engagements was more demoralizing to the
Allied effort.
These two offensives were characteristic of
the uncoordinated Allied effort throughout
this phase of the war. General Nivelle had
emerged from the Verdun defense a national
hero. Appointed on 12 December 1916 as
French Commander-in-Chief, he planned an
offensive in the direction of Laon to effect a
breakthrough. Field Marshal Haig disagreed,
preferring that emphasis be placed on his own
offensive in Flanders. In the absence of a
Supreme Allied Commander, Nivelle appealed
to Britain's Lloyd George, whose relationship
with Haig was less than cordial. At Lloyd
George's insistence, the British War Cabinet in
secret session subordinated Ilaig to the
French general for the offensive. Haig's
opposition was bolstered by the objections of
Nivelle's own staff officers and by the cabinet
of Premier Ribot. In a frenzy of
temperament, Nivelle threatened resignation
and was reluctantly permitted to initiate his
offensive, with disastrous results.
The real tragedy lay not so much in the
military defeat, but in the petty differences
that existed among the generals and statesmen
which allowed such blunders to occur. What a
congeries of tangled events are reflected in
this sjtuation of a French general who, when
proposing an offensive plan, was discouraged
by his chief military ally, his own advisers,
and by the government to which he was
responsible. Yet he appealed to the prime
minister of a foreign state, who approved the
plan over the head of his own field
commander and, in secret, placed his
countryman under a French general. Haig, not
to be outdone, persisted in mounting his own
offensive d e s p i t e similar professional

directive authority on the Allied Western
Front. Such an authority, i.e., a supreme
headquarters having the power to reconcike
strategic guidance from all the states involved,
could have weighed the elements of both
offensive plans, determined which was the
better, and thrown the preponderance of
Allied power into the one offensive which
evidenced a greater probability of success. Or,
a unitary headquarters could have rejected
both plans and proposed a third operation
elsewhere. The summer of 191 7, however,
was not a period of Allied harmony and no
such command existed.

obvious that those two defeats may be
attributed in part to the absence of a central

American units without consulting the AEF
commander-and incurring the attendant delay.

ALLIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION, PHASE I

Figure 1 represents a reasonable
approximation of the command channels of
the Allied Powers during Phase I. A glance at
the chart shows four separate lines of
authority, originating in the national political
and military establishments and extending
down to the armies in the field. There was no
central military headquarters, no single focal
point at which multilateral policies could be
resolved into a combined military effort.
Resolution of differences rested entirely on
mutual agreement at national levels through
the liaison lines which represented the
diplomatic channels, and at national force
headquarters levels. There was no formal
international machinery for the exchange of
intelligence or operations information, no
planning agency, no logistics coordination. It
is not surprising that there was little mutual
support and a great deal of inherent suspicion
when each national force was an entity within
itself and had no communications except for
occasional command conferences with the
ally on its flank.
Most American units, though under the
command of American Expeditionary Force
Headquarters, were placed under British and
French Armies for field training, subject to
recall by Pershing. In effect, if sudden,
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ENTER PERSHING: MORE COALS ON THE FIRE

Another relevant event of Phase I was
America's entry into the war on 6 April 1917.
A p p o i n t e d Commander-in-Chief of the
American Expeditionary Force, General John
J. Pershing early recognized the Allies'
problem. Prior to the deployment of
American units to France, he made this entry
in his journal:
. . . there was a lack of cooperation
between their Armies. First one and then
another would attack, each apparently
without reference to the other. . . they
would never win the war until they
secured unity of action under some form
of coordinated control.

Pershing's orders from Secretary of War
Newton Baker placed the AEF commander at
odds with the other principal Allied leaders.
T h e instructions given Pershing which
directed "separate and distinct" American
forces were interpreted by hi to mean that
the US force should fight in its own sector of
the front. Pershing was unyielding in his
opposition to the Allied wish to use
Americans as individual replacements or as
small unit reinforcements.
Petain and Haig were equally as obdurate in
their demands that American units be
fragmented and integrated into Allied
formations. The French and British marshals
even proposed that US troops be used as a
vast individual replacement pool for the
French and British divisions.
Thus, an impasse developed which would
frustrate the achievement of Allied command
unity for nearly a year. By the end of 1917,
the morale of the Allies was at low ebb,
manpower and munitions wcre critically
short, and the prospect of at least another
year of war seemed certain.
After three years of conflict, it would
appear that rational men such as Lloyd
George, Clemenceau, Petain, and Ilaig would
realize the folly of continuing the struggle on
such a disjointed basis and would agree to
resolve their differences, pool their resources,
and offer an indivisible entente to the Central

US

Anni

The AEF commander in World War I,
General John J. Pershing,
wanted US troops to maintain their national
identity as a "separate and distinct" force.

Powers. However, no such resolution was
forthcoming. Ironically, the first step toward
combined Allied action was occasioned by a
successful enemy offensive which compelled
modification of the fractured Allied method
of running the war.
PHASE 11: 7 NOVEMBER 191 7 TO 21 MARCH 1918

The withdrawal of Russia from the war in
1917 boded ill for the Allies. The Russian exit
meant the release of more German troops for
action against the Allies in France and Italy.
On 24 October, von Bulow's reinforced
Austro-Gennan armies launched an offensive
in the Alps which culminated in the rout of
the Italian Army beyond the Taglialnento
River. By 4 November, General Cadoma had
further withdrawn his forces over the Piave,
with tremendous losses in personnel and
supplies.
Allied fortunes were at their lowest point

since 1914. Nivelle's and Haig's failures,
followed by the Tyrolean breakthrough,
seemed almost too much to endure.
P r o c r a s t i n a t i o n became an intolerable
luxury-further mismanaged operations could
spell eventual defeat.
RAPALLO - 7 NOVEMBER 1917

Lloyd George, Premier Painleve' of France,
and Generals Smuts, Robertson, and Foch
traveled to Rapallo, Italy in the wake of the
Italian disaster to consider actions to bolster
the disintegrating Italian front. In early
November, in addition to an immediate
dispatch of French and British reinforcements
from France, a proposal was made to create a
Supreme War Council for future coordination
of the Allied effort. Generally thought t o be
Lloyd George's idea, it was proposed to the
conference by Painleve' and readily accepted
by the representatives of all three powers in
attendance. The fourth power, the United
States, was to be integrated as soon as
practicable.
The best general account of tlie nature of
the Council (later to become known as the
Versailles Council) was given by G. A. B.
Dewar:
Now at Rapallo it was resolved to
establish a council composed of the Prime
Minister and a member of the government
of each Great Power whose armies were
fighting on that front.. . the general
staffs and commanders of the armies of
each Power charged with the conduct of
military operations were to remain
responsible to their respective
governments. The general war plans
drawn up by the military authorities were
to be submitted to the new council,
which would then propose, if it thought
fit, any desirable changes therein. Each
power was to appoint a permanent
military representative to act as a
technical advisor to the council. . . . It
was settled that the council should
normally meet at Versailles where the
permanent military representatives would
be established. There was to be at least

The first step had been taken. The Supreme
War Council was not destined t o be the
remedy for all Allied difficulties, but now
there was at least a sounding board, an
effective interlock between the generals and
the politicians-a framework upon which
unity could be built.
T h e American representative on the
permanent military council was General
Tasker H. Bliss. In a report to the US
Secretary of State in December 1917, he
expressed his reservations concerning the
ultimate effectiveness of the Council.
Preferring complete unified control, he
stated:

i
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The military men of the Allies admit its
necessity and are ready for it. They
object to Mr. Lloyd George's plan of
Rapalio. . .for the reason that, on last
analysis, it gives political and not military
control. . . .
Despite his doubts, Bliss later conceded
that the council's creation had more merit
than he originally supposed. In a final report
to the Secretary of State, he wrote:
The great value of the Supreme War
Council consisted in bringing together the
political heads of the governments . . . i n
causing each to consider . . . problems not
only in light of its own interest, but in
that of others.
ALLIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION, PHASE I1
I

Figure 2 portrays the command structure
of the Allied forces during Phase 11. The
newly-created Supreme War Council and its
board of Permanent Military Representatives
have been added to the chart. The liaison lines
and strategic direction lines shown in Figure 1
(from the national military and political
establishments t o the field commands)
remain. (For simplicity, only France's
strategic direction line is depicted on the
diagram.)
The line of representation extends from
each national establishment to the Supreme
War Council. comoosed of Llovd Georee.
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COORDINATION

THE GENERAL RESERVE CRISIS

One of the first major tasks assumed by the
pennanent military representatives was the
creation of an Allied General Reserve force.
Based upon the shared premise of Haig and
Petain that the American Army would be of
little value in taking over a portion of the
front in 1918, the Supreme War Council
decided to create a pool of Allied divisions t o
be moved where needed in the event of major
G e r m a n offensives. T h e permanent
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s assumed the title of
"Executive Committee," for which the
following prerogatives and guidelines were
established:

In 1918, Marshal Henri Petain of France, shown here
on his 1931 visit to the Army War College, did not
subscribe to the idea of giving US troops a
separate sector on the Allied front.
(later replaced by General Bliss). The
exchange between the Council and its
Permanent Military Representatives represents
a staff-command relationship in which
r e q u e s t s for information were passed
d o w n w a r d a n d recommendations sent
upward.
The entire output of the Council is
represented by a dotted line of coordination,
which was the limit of its authority. The
block representing the Allied General Reserve
is broken, since its creation was not effected
during this phase. It can be seen that
American forces were still subordinate to the
Allies for training, although command
remained with Pershing. The introduction of
French and British divisions in Italy following
Caporetto are also shown.
The fundamental weakness in the entire
command structure is reflected in the
strategic direction line. Even though a council
to coordinate the overall effort had been
created, the final decision on how forces
would be employed still rested with the
national government of each Allied power.

e Authority to consult with the separate
commanders-in-chief to:
- Determine the strength of each national
contribution.
- Select locations for stationing of the
reserve.
- Arrange transport for troops ordered
concentrated in any sector.
- Issue orders and hand over troops to
the commanders-in-chief concerned for use in
operations. (The reserve would then come
under the operational control of designated
commanders for the duration of a particular
operation.)
Right of appeal by any military
representative to the Supreme War Council,
when d i f f e r e n c e s o f o p i n i o n were
irreconcilable.
0 Veto
authority over any proposed
movement of the Allied General Reserve.

Foch was appointed President of the
Executive Committee. Another step had been
t a k e n w h i c h , if i m p l e m e n t e d , w o u l d
provide a substantial force capable of
influencing the action in any sector. Ideally,
the reserve should have been placed under a
single commander rather than a committee,
but at that stage of developments its de facto
creation, regardless of command relationships,
was a significant achievement.
By 6 February 1918, the Executive
Committee published a note which designated
the national contributions to the General
Reserve as follows:

British Divisions - 10
French Divisions - 13
Italian Divisions - 7
On 2 March, Haig and Petain initiated a
j o i n t move which positioned another
roadblock in the path of Allied command
unity. General Henry Rawlinson, then British
Representative on the Executive Committee,
reported this new development in a letter to
Lloyd George:
In his letter of 2nd March, the Field
Marshal Commander-in-chief (Haig)
states that he is unable to comply with
the request contained in the joint note of
the Executive War Board.
Under the circumstances of the joint
note, the Executive finds itself unable to
continue its work and therefore unable to
organize the Inter-Allied General Reserve
as the Supreme War Council. . .had
instructed it to do . . . .
Haig and Petain had joined causes. They
had conveniently arranged to shift (on a
reciprocal basis) divisions within their
r e s p e c t i v e fronts t o cope with any
contingency that one or the other might
encounter. Both refused to yield up any
forces to a general pool.
T h e inefficacy of this arrangement,
effectively killing the General Reserve
concept for the time, was to prove disastrous
to Ilaig several weeks later, and nearly
enveloped the Allied effort in chaos.
Throughout Phase 11, American troops
poured into France. Pershing remained firm in
his stand for the creation of an American
Army to man a portion of the front. He
turned a deaf ear to all Allied entreaties that
his troops be used as fillers for French and
British units or that they be constituted as
part of a reserve. He cabled Secretary of War
Baker on 8 January after receiving a French
r e q u e s t t h a t American divisions be
fragmented among French and British units:
Have expressed a willingness to aid in any
way in an emergency but do not think
good reason exists for us to break up our
divisions and scatter regiments for service
among the French and British. . . .

He was even more adamant at a conference
with Haig, Petain, Foch, and Robertson on 18
January when he stated in response to a
suggestion by Robertson that American forces
should constitute a reserve:
. . . I also took occasion to emphasize the
point that we expected as a matter of
course that the American Army would
have its own front as an independent
force and would not be used merely as a
reserve to be sent here and there . . . .

And so it went. Despite the creation of an
organization to resolve differences, the Allied
leaders continued to operate after their own
fashion, vacillating from plan to plan. In late
March 19 18, the Germans helped them make
up their minds.
PHASE 111: 22 MARCH TO 11 NOVEMBER 1918
In March of 19 18, the anticipated German
Spring Offensive, preceded by heavy artillery
a n d gas bombardment, surged across
"no-man's land" and slammed full force into
the British lines north of the Oise and St.
Quentin. Gough's Fifth Army was almost
annihilated and the adjacent French and
British forces were split apart. The
desperation of those critical days was revealed
in two cryptic extracts from the diary of a
chronicler at British GHQ:
March 22. The fighting today has gone
badly for us.. . . It is very serious. We
have practically no reserves. . . . By the
26th the French reinforcements should
begin to arrive . . . .
And another entry, three days later:
March 25. The situation is veiy serious
both in the battle and behind it. The right
of the Third Army and the whole of the
Fifth Army have been driven back right
through their defensive areas, and the
Germans are still pressing on.
Apparently the French reinforcements
will not arrive until the end of the
month-another five days. Worse than
that, Petain met D. H. [Douglas Haig]

last night at Drury and told him that if
the German attack were pressed on the
right, he had ordered the local French
Commander to withdraw southwest and
cover Paris. . . . D. 11. has telegraphed
home asking that a Generalissimo for the
whole Western Front be appointed at
once as the only possible means of having
Petain overruled.
This last journal entry underlines the
inappropriateness of Haig's and Petain's
agreement relative to the constitution and
employment of reserve forces. Despite the
s i n c e r e character of t h i s m u t u a l
understanding, its terms were of no avail at
the time of reckoning.
Petain may have been completely justified
in withholding his troops, but the greatest
intentions in the world did not help Haig in
his hour of need. The interesting paradox here
is that the man who had vetoed the Allied
General Reserve plan now appealed to his
own government for "unity of command."
DOULLENS (MARCH 26) AND
BEAWAIS (APRIL 3)

The generals and statesmen of France and
Great Britain met in the town hall at Doullens
to determine how best to save the British
Army, now falling back on Amiens and the
channel ports. To his credit, Haig advanced
the recommendation that "Foch should
co-ordinate the action of all the Allied Armies
on the Western Front" (italics are Haig's). At
Iast, someone would be in charge-perhaps
not a commander vested with all requisite
authority, but at least someone akin to a
central coordinator. The conduct of military
operations by committee was terminated.
Why was Foch chosen to be the Allied
generalissimo, rather than Haig or Petain?
Foch was a compromise choice. There was by
then little affinity between Haig and Petain
and it is doubtful if either would have
accepted the other as generalissimo. Liddell
Hart summarizes the compromise:
Foch's position indicated him as the
natural, almost inevitable, man to

reconcile their differing points of view
and coordinate their efforts . . . .
No one perhaps could so well have
guided a difficult team of soldiers or have
made a better reconciliation of
conflicting national interests in times of
anxiety and stress.
Foch quickly assumed his mantle of
responsibility and set about the formidable
task of restoring the front. He pieced together
the remnants of the British Fifth Army and
saw to the dispatch of French divisions into
the British sector. By 29 March, order was
emerging from chaos and the German attack
had been slowed to a manageable pace.
General Pershing was impressed by the
seriousness of the situation. On 28 March, he
drove to the French headquarters at Clermont
and delivered his "A11 I have" speech to Foch.
In short, he placed the entire American force
then in France at the Marshal's disposal for
the duration of the emergency. The final
barrier to unified operations had fallen.
The role of Foch as coordinator rather than
as a commander was soon recognized to be
less than ideal. At Beauvais, on 3 April,
Premier Clemenceau proposed to modify the
Doullens agreement to entrust to Foch the
strategic direction of all Allied armies. Each
commander-in-chief was to have the right of
appeal to his government, if in his opinion his
forces were endangered by reason of any
order received from Foch. This development
abolished the previously established Executive
Committee for the Allied General Reserve. On
14 May 1918, Foch was designated
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in
France.
The Beauvais conference, attended by the
French, British, and American strategists,
resolved the future role of the US Army.
Pershing, during the conference, rose to his
feet and stated that all future references to
the Allied command would apply to the
American Army. This modification was
adopted and Pershing was then officially
conceded his much desired American Army
and American zone. Nevertheless, he did not
retract his own concession to Foch of 28
March. Some American units served for the

US Army

Soldiers of the 307th US Infantry near the Argonne Forest on 26 September 1918.
Two French officers can be seen in the upper left portion of the photograph.

remainder of the war with their French and
British counterparts, although the bulk of the
US forces operated in the American sector.
T h e s e c o n d command transition was
accomplished.
ALLIED COMMAND ORGANIZATION, PHASE III

Figure 3 depicts the final stage of
development of the combined command as
modified in the spring of 1918. This was the
structure within which final victory was
achieved.
T h e Allied High Command (Foch's

headquarters) was formed and provided
strategic direction for the several national
c o m p o n e n t s . T h e separate
commanders-in-chief retained conlnland over
all national elements; however, the coinbat
operations of a few American units were
controlled by either the French or British
headquarters. The Supreme War Cou~lcilstill
existed, providing strategic direction to Foch,
who reviewed the plans of the separate armies
under his direction. Liaison at the national
and field army level was maintained as in
previous phases. Running from the French
Political and Military Establishment (omitted
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from United States and British channels to
avoid cluttering the diagram) is the line which
represents the channel of appeal. The addition
of this line reflects the reservation of the
Beauvais agreement granting the right of
appeal of any of Foch's decisions to higher
n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y . While the field
c o m m a n d er-in-chief retained operational
control of his forces, under the strategic
direction of the Allied High Command, final
authority to execute remained with the
several national governments. Conceivably,
this authority could extend even to the
withdrawal of forces from the war, but such a
critical situation never arose. It would be
unWtely that any nation would yield
complete authority for its forces to a foreign
commander. Thus, the arrangement depicted
on the chart probably represents the best
p o s s i b l e s t r u c t u r e considering t h e
circumstances existing in the late days of
World War I. Had the war continued into
1919 or later, additional refinements might
have been in order. It is unfortunate that the
Allied High Command was not created earlier
in the war.
Italy never accepted Foch as a Supreme
C o m m a n d e r , b u t considered him a
"coordinator" who had no actual command
influence over the Italian Army. The Italian
national government continued to exercise
direct supervision of its field forces and
bypassed the Supreme Command. This
difference in viewpoint held by the Italians
highlights t h e difficulty of reaching
unanimous agreement among cobelligerents as
their number is increased. Fortunately, Italy's
strategic role at that time was not of the
consequence generally attributed to the other
three major Allied powers.
THE FINISH
In all, Germany conducted five offensives
before her Armies were stopped west of the
Oise on 13 June 19 18. From June until the
Armistice, the Allied offensives highlighted
the waning months of the war. These
successful Allied campaigns are a tribute to
the combined efforts of the French and
British, joined now by the Belgians and

bolstered by the ceaseless tide of fresh
American t r o o p s . Raymond Recouly,
concluding his biography of Foch, describes
the events of the summer and autumn of 19 18:
The high command of the Allies.. . had
never been in better form. The battle just
fought and won (Marne Offensive) had
brought out like a searchlight the
splendid qualities of our staff and had
confirmed the wisdom of unity of
command; under the orders of Foch,
French, British, Americans and Italians all
had their share in this great victory, the
final turning point of the war . . . .
UNITY OF COMMAND IN RETROSPECT
Unity of command was not a panacea for
the Allies-not an infallible prescription that
guaranteed the total collapse of the Central
Powers. Other factors had their influence in
the German defeat. The infusion of American
troops and materiel sparked renewal of a
flagging effort in the somber winter of
1917-18. The German submarine blockade
failed due to British domination of the sea
lanes, and the great German Spring Offensive
of 1918 was halted because of German
miscalculation and the display of Allied
solidarity.
However, history affirms the fact that the
Allies did not realize great success in France
until they adopted a framework of unanimity
and centralization of operations. The array of
powerful armies, each bound to the others by
the covenants of Rapallo, Beauvais, and
Doullens, were too formidable for the enemy
to defeat in detail. Allied unity had created an
overwhelming preponderance
of massed
strength which the flagging German Armies
could not check in the summer of 1918.
Historians are prone to contemplate what
"might have happened if circumstances had
been different." Various views have been
advanced on how and when the war would
have ended if, for instance, the Supreme War
Council or the Allied General Reserve had
been created earlier or later. The tendency in
this case is to reflect on one incident, a
notable Allied success, which if exploited

“might" have ended the war a year earlier
with a saving of countless lives.
The British tank breakthrough in the
vicinity of Cambrai in November 19 17 is an
example of an "unexploited exploitable."
Byng's Third Army, spearheaded by 400
tanks, cracked the "Hindenburg Switch" near
the southern flank of the Third Army's
sector. Driving to within several kilometers of
Cambrai, British armor ruptured the line to a
depth of four and one-half miles in a matter
of hours. The line was only restored by the
Germans after several days of heavy fighting
and depletion of local reserves. If an Allied
General Reserve had existed at that time and
if an Allied Force of ten divisions had been
poured into the gap, impetus alone could have
carried the attack to Coblenz. Speculation?
Perhaps. But surprise in warfare, when
exploited with combat power, has achieved
advantages that care and deliberation have
never delivered. The absence of an
e m p l o y a b l e reserve m a k e s f u r t h e r
consideration academic.
In the final analysis, the terminal success of

the Allied Supreme Command can best be
attributed to the personalities involved. Foch
and Haig, whose Armies did the lion's share of
the work, cooperated. Pershing became
increasingly amenable. All possessed the
professional stature to bury their differences
to achieve a goal in the common interest. The
military, however, does not merit all of the
plaudits because of its internal cooperation.
The politicians also rose above their national
i n t e r e s t s and supported the idea of
unification. Holding the policy reins, with
post-war aims never out of mind, the civilian
leaders nevertheless yielded tactical
management of the war to the professional
soldiers.
Civilian and soldier, together, established a
grand precedent-one which would be
acknowledged by a different generation of
soldiers and statesmen in a different war. The
axioms and postulates of coalition warfare so
painfully garnered in the Great War would
underlie Allied cooperation in World War I1
and contribute substantially to its successful
outcome.

Nothing is more important in war than unity in command.

- Napoleon Bonaparte
1769-1821

